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Abstract 
∎ The Small Island Development States (SIDS) and other developing coun-
tries affected by climate change are demanding more attention be given 
to climate-related losses and damages. The issue of “loss and damage” is 
being addressed in UNFCCC negotiations; however, the SIDS regard the 
Security Council as another key place for related debates. 
∎ The Security Council can sound out climate policy interests to increase 
knowledge and improve the means of early warning. Moreover, its role 
can be to focus on the security aspects of climate risks and highlight im-
portant preventive approaches. These include, above all, development 
policy and the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(the UN 2030 Agenda). 
∎ The demands on the Security Council are strongly linked to the inter-
national climate negotiations. Thus, Germany’s commitment to climate 
policy has to be broad and long-term in times of dwindling multilateral-
ism. 
∎ Due to the Corona pandemic, short-term national and international 
policy agendas have readjusted to address the crisis situation, which has 
been detrimental to the climate policy agenda. A debate at the Security 
Council should nevertheless keep the focus on climate-related risks as 
such. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Addressing the Risks of Climate Change:  
What Role for the UN Security Council? 
The German government has announced it will make 
security policy implications from climate change once 
more a topic for the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council. The next meeting hosted by Germany is to 
take place in July 2020 while Germany holds a non-
permanent seat on the body (2019/2020). The impacts 
from climate change have increased dramatically in 
recent years. Small island development states (SIDS) 
such as Nauru, the Marshall Islands, the Maldives, 
and Vanuatu claim that security policy and the UN 
Security Council should be dealing with climate im-
pacts. In their opinion, the negotiations under the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
have so far paid too little attention to the “loss and 
damage” caused by climate change. The European 
countries Germany, the United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Sweden, and France are supporting 
the SIDS in the attempt to continuously address the 
issue at the UN Security Council. However, expecta-
tions of an active role for the Council and its scope 
for action diverge widely. Also, there are other UN 
institutions that deal with climate impacts. 
A closer look at the claims made by the SIDS also 
reveals contradictions. If the island states lose their 
territories due to rising sea levels, this is an existential 
threat, but not a risk to international security per se. 
Over the past 10 years, the Security Council has de-
bated climate risks with increasing frequency. Reso-
lutions on crisis situations in Africa have included 
references to the significance of climate change. 
There is little supporting evidence so far about 
direct causalities between climate risks and violence 
which the Security Council could focus on. For the 
majority of experts in conflict research, climate 
change contributes only very indirectly to outbreaks 
of violence compared with other conflict risks. How-
ever, climate impacts can interact strongly with these 
risks and are therefore regarded as a threat multiplier. 
The potential of climate change as an indirect driver 
of conflict needs to be further explored in order to 
identify specific situations and examples for a causal 
relationship. So far, there has also been a lack of knowl-
edge about why violent conflicts do not occur in par-
ticular regions hit by extreme climate-related events. 
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So what could be the role of the UN Security 
Council in dealing with climate change risks? In the 
short to medium term, the Council can generate more 
attention for international climate policy. In several 
resolutions, it has already pointed out the risks that 
climate change poses to human security. If the Secu-
rity Council emphasises the preventive nature of ef-
forts to protect the climate, this can generate pressure 
on the UNFCCC negotiators. Moreover, the Council 
can bring into focus more narrowly defined security-
related climate impacts, such as a deterioration of the 
security situation in crisis areas. It can also highlight 
preventive approaches that are important for security 
policy, above all development aid and the implemen-
tation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
The calls for the Security Council to intercede in 
climate policy will become louder if the UNFCCC 
negotiations stall. In view of the withdrawal of the 
United States from this policy field, Germany’s com-
mitment is an essential building block in keeping 
those UN member states aboard that struggle to see a 
point in the implementation of the Paris Agreement 
(PA) – or those that are calling for more financial as 
well as other forms of support from the industrialised 
countries in the negotiations about loss and damage 
caused by climate change. Thus, the purpose of a 
Security Council debate is to exert more pressure on 
non-cooperative heads of state and government. Due 
to the Corona pandemic, short-term national and 
international policy agendas have readjusted, which 
has been detrimental to the climate policy agenda. 
However, the global pandemic crisis also offers some 
new entry points for better cooperation on multilat-
eral issues by demonstrating that national interest 
alone does not deliver reliable solutions for short- or 
long-term global challenges. 
In the upcoming debate at the Security Council, 
the German government can ensure that greater focus 
is placed on the specific links between climate risks 
and security threats, highlighting the role of scientific 
evidence and the need for better data. To this end, it 
can offer financial support for the Climate Security 
Mechanism, which provides additional personnel in 
the UN Secretary-General’s Department of Political 
Affairs (DPPA). This support should be established on 
a permanent basis. 
Furthermore, open debates in which all UN mem-
ber states participate can be used as a forum to ex-
plore the particular interests in the global climate 
agenda. The United States, Russia, and China, as veto 
powers of the Security Council, have concerns about 
giving the Council an active role in climate policy 
and, in parallel, are slowing the implementation of 
the Paris Agreement. Therefore, the debates in New 
York help to confront these states with the climate 
policy concerns of the majority of UN members. Never-
theless, common interests exist on specific issues, also 
among these big players. The United States, for exam-
ple, is open to expanding disaster risk management, 
and China has repeatedly stressed its support for 
climate policy cooperation within the United Nations. 
In this respect, it remains to be seen how the virus 
“blame game” by the US president will influence the 
overall attitude of the United States at the Council, 
and whether this will contribute to a repositioning 
of China in a more supportive direction regarding 
climate-related security risks. 
Germany therefore has an important role to play 
in the current period of its non-permanent seat on 
the Security Council – not least because it also holds 
the Council Presidency of the European Union (EU) 
in the second half of 2020. Beyond 2020 the German 
government should maintain a permanent commit-
ment with regard to the security policy implications 
of climate change. 
In the long term, a successful approach to limit 
climate-related security risks depends on cooperation 
with partner countries both inside and outside the 
EU. It also depends on financial resources for UN 
institutions as a whole, and especially for those who 
provide the Security Council with information. Wash-
ington’s departure from multilateralism, which could 
continue after the autumn elections, also leaves major 
gaps here, which need to be filled as far as possible. 
Unfortunately, the international climate negotiations 
fall short of expectations and, as a consequence, the 
vulnerable states will maintain their diplomatic pres-
sure in New York. They will continue using their 
votes to demand climate policy support from those 
countries running for a non-permanent seat in elec-
tions to the Security Council – this demand will 
increase, since the number of developing countries 
vulnerable to climate change will continue to rise. 
Accordingly, a cooperative agenda needs to be devel-
oped with like-minded partners – an agenda that can 
be pursued in New York, under the UNFCCC climate 
negotiations, and in other climate policy forums (in-
cluding the G20 and G7). 
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Since the early days of the UNFCCC regime, develop-
ing countries affected by climate change have been 
demanding that climate impacts be taken into account 
in international negotiations, just as much as pro-
tecting the climate through emission reductions. 
The SIDS, which include, for example, the Marshall 
Islands, Vanuatu, Nauru, Mauritius, and the Maldives, 
are campaigning to broaden the international secu-
rity policy debate to include the risks of climate 
change.1 As early as 1992, at the United Nations Con-
ference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in Rio 
de Janeiro, they appealed to the international com-
munity to take seriously the existential threat that 
climate change poses to their territories and to act 
accordingly.2 Many low-lying SIDS are threatened 
by permanent land loss due to sea level rise.3 The 
livelihoods of many other developing countries are 
threatened by climate change, too, and the SIDS have 
not only been early pioneers but have also become 
the most prominent voice of these vulnerable coun-
tries. In particular, the SIDS demand that there should 
be a “place” in the UN system to deal with the exis-
tential threats posed by climate change impacts.4 In 
 
1 They belong to the Alliance of Small Island States, which 
comprises 45 island states – including members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). 
2 UNFCCC, Climate Change, Small Island Developing States 
(Bonn, 2005), http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/CPADocs/ 
Climate%20Change%20SIDs.pdf (accessed 11 March 2019). 
3 Meanwhile loss and damage is a topic that is included in 
the Paris Agreement (Article 8 PA). UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, 
2015, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf 
(accessed 21 January 2020). 
4 Marlene Moses, “UN Mission: Statement by Ambassador 
Moses at ECOSOC Meeting 13 Nov 2018”, Nauru News (online), 
their view, the Security Council is the appropriate 
body in this respect. Moreover, from 2009 they started 
suggesting that a Special Representative for Climate 
and Security be established with the UN Secretary-
General.5 
Since 1994 the climate regime has evolved under 
the UNFCCC. This regime is effective only if it is 
legally and institutionally equipped in such a way 
that the acting parties can counter climate change 
by means of cooperation, and eventually achieve 
the agreed goals. In order to make progress in this 
respect, the 196 parties6 to the UNFCCC adopted the 
Paris Agreement in December 2015. It entered into 
force in 2016 and goes into effect in 2020. The agree-
ment aims to keep the increase in the global mean 
temperature well below 2 degrees Celsius compared 
to pre-industrial levels and to make efforts to limit 
it to 1.5 degrees Celsius (Art. 2[1]a, PA). Also, it stipu-
lates that its parties should regularly renew their 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to achieve 
the global temperature target and not fall behind pre-
vious efforts. In the second half of this century, green-
house gas emission neutrality is to be achieved, that 
 
http://nauru-news.com/un-mission-statement-ambassador-
moses-ecosoc-meeting-13-nov-2018/ (accessed 7 February 2019). 
5 In 2018, the SIDS suggested to implement a rapporteur to 
regularly collect evidence on national security threats caused 
by climate change. Pacific Islands Forum, Forum Communiqué. 
Forty-Ninth Pacific Islands Forum (Nauru: Pacific Islands Forum, 
3 September 2018), 4, https://www.un.org/humansecurity/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/09/49th-Pacific-Islands-Forum-
Communiqu%C3%A9.pdf (accessed 15 August 2019). 
6 In 2019 the UNFCCC had 197 parties, including 196 coun-
tries. The EU is a separate contracting party. See United 
Nations, List of Parties, 2019, https://unfccc.int/process/parties-
non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-
states (accessed 30 November 2019). 
Why Are There Climate 
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is, a balance between greenhouse gas emissions and 
their uptake by sinks7 (Article 4[1], PA). 
The Paris Agreement is a universal agreement, 
meaning that, contrary to the Kyoto Protocol, all 
parties signed up to take efforts against climate 
change, instead of specifying only those who are 
known as historical polluters, such as the United 
States and European countries. The Paris Agreement 
has also broadened the scope from enabling climate 
protection to a more comprehensive governance 
approach. The scope of the agreement also includes 
adaptation to climate change, the financing of 
climate policy, and dealing with loss and damage 
from global warming. 
Given this universal regime, the question arises 
why the SIDS and other vulnerable developing coun-
tries also turn to the Security Council to draw atten-
tion to their situation. Should the Security Council, 
which is composed of five permanent and ten rotat-
ing non-permanent member states (see Table 1), be 
addressing the risks of climate change – and how 
could it do so? 
When considering the role that the UNFCCC on the 
one hand, and the UN Security Council on the other, 
 
7 Sinks are, for example, forests or other natural systems 
that absorb greenhouse gases. 
should and could play in dealing with climate change 
risks, fundamental considerations about the design of 
multilateral regimes come into play, as do short-term 
political considerations. The climate regime’s effec-
tiveness is hampered by the fact that its core element, 
the NDCs, has very limited legal bindingness, and 
its implementation depends to a large extent on the 
political willingness to act as well as the actual am-
bitions of the parties. A further shortcoming became 
apparent in 2017. At that time, US President Donald 
Trump announced that he would withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement and roll back the US climate regu-
lations of his predecessor, Barack Obama. The with-
drawal will take effect on November 4, 2020, and the 
Paris Agreement does not provide for any sanctions 
or alternative approaches in such a case. 
Dealing with climate policy issues in the Security 
Council – and in other international institutions – 
thus can help to improve the effectiveness of the 
climate regime by increasing the pressure for climate 
action. The first chapter of this research paper elabo-
rates on how the members of the Security Council 
have been debating climate change risks so far.8 
 
8 See chapter “Climate Change Impacts and the UN Secu-
rity Council – What Has Happened to Date”, pp. 10ff. 
Table 1 
Elected members on the UN Security Council 2020/2021 
Group of … 2020 2021 
African countries  ..........................................  3 seats Niger,  
Tunisia, 
South Africa* 
Niger, 
Tunisia, 
N. N. 
Asian countries  .............................................  2 seats Indonesia,* 
Vietnam 
Vietnam, 
N. N. 
Eastern European countries  .........................  1 seat Estonia Estonia 
Latin American and Caribbean countries  ...  2 seats Dominican Republic,* 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, 
N.N. 
West European and other countries ............  2 seats Belgium,* 
Germany* 
N. N., 
N. N. 
* Non-permanent seat ends in December 2020, new election from this group for 2021/2022 expected in June 2020. 
Source: United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Security Council Elections 2019. Research Report (New York,  
14 May 2019; no. 2). Idem, Current Members United Nations Security Council (2019). 
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However, in order to shed more light on the role 
that the Council can play with respect to the increas-
ing amount of risk posed by climate change, a closer 
look is needed at the security policy–relevant threats 
that exist or will potentially arise in the future. An 
increasing number of research projects on individual 
regions and states are looking into their exposure 
to potential or actual risks due to climate change im-
pacts.9 Risks that can exacerbate conflict situations 
include supply bottlenecks, humanitarian emergen-
cies, and displacement. Specific links between climate 
impacts and conflicts exist, depending on the country 
or region and on the extent to which climate risks 
already exist. Extreme weather events such as droughts 
and repeated tropical storms as well as longer-term 
supply shortages (e.g. for fresh water or food) can 
contribute to violent outbreaks where tensions exist 
already, as can, more generally, reductions in socio-
economic development potential, especially in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. Those countries that are 
particularly affected by climate change risks are listed 
in another chapter of this paper.10 
The Paris Agreement does not 
sufficiently take account of the 
vulnerable countries’ concerns. 
The gradual loss of territory alone that affects low-
lying island states does not necessarily have to come 
with, or give rise to, violent conflicts. Several factors 
contribute to the potential for violence, and they 
differ from case to case. Among the decisive factors 
are whether national governments can manage the 
problems, whether they belong to the group of fragile 
and vulnerable countries, their economic situation, 
their institutional settings to address the challenges, 
and their experience with natural disasters to date. 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015) 
underlines the situation of the SIDS and highlights 
the role of the UN following the declaration “The 
Future We Want”, which was adopted at the UNCSD 
(“Rio+20”) in 2012. This declaration states that the 
developing island states should be given special sup-
port by the United Nations because their small size, 
remoteness, limited resources, and dependence on 
global environmental and economic developments 
 
9 See chapter “Climate Change and Conflicts – State of 
Research”, pp. 19ff. 
10 See chapter “Countries Particularly Vulnerable to Cli-
mate Risks – Global Overview”, pp. 25ff. 
lead to a high degree of vulnerability, especially when 
it comes to climate change impacts.11 From a security 
policy perspective, however, many other countries 
are even more vulnerable to climate risks and related 
conflicts. 
A subsequent chapter describes why the Paris 
Agreement’s design and provisions do not sufficiently 
address the concerns of vulnerable countries.12 The 
SIDS, together with other developing countries, were 
successful in achieving provisions on climate-related 
“loss and damage” under Article 8 of the PA. However, 
this step has not yet led to more concrete support or 
more effective climate protection at the global level. 
In 2013 already, a mechanism was established under 
the UNFCCC – the Warsaw International Mechanism 
(WIM) – building a setting in which stakeholders 
discuss definitions, risk management approaches to 
climate impacts, the need for more intensive coopera-
tion between institutions and stakeholders as well as 
more support for the countries affected.13 The WIM 
will be evaluated in 2020. 
At the climate negotiations in Madrid in 2019 (Con-
ference of the Parties – COP25), there were again 
more calls for financial support for countries affected 
by loss and damage. The United States and other 
countries with high historical emissions oppose this 
claim because of a potential attribution of liabilities 
for losses and damages from climate change. The 
prospects seem poor that the affected countries as 
well as others involved in the negotiations will bring 
more justice to the issue within the UNFCCC climate 
regime. At least it was possible to establish various 
expert groups in Madrid in 2019, and to bring to-
gether in the “Santiago Network” those players who 
are active in disaster prevention and technical co-
operation – thus providing some more direct support 
to vulnerable countries.14 In view of the sluggish 
 
11 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution by 
the General Assembly on 27 July 2012. The Future We Want (New 
York, NY, 11 September 2012), https://www.un.org/ga/search/ 
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E (accessed 22 
November 2019). 
12 See chapter “How Does the UNFCCC Address Climate 
Risks?”, pp. 29ff. 
13 UNFCCC, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM), https:// 
unfccc.int/WIM (accessed 21 October 2019). 
14 IISD Reporting Services, Earth Negotiations Bulletin. Sum-
mary of the Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference: 2–15 Decem-
ber 2019, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, no. 775 (18 December 
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progress, the UN Security Council is, from the point 
of view of many vulnerable developing countries, a 
place to raise awareness about the risks of climate 
change as well as to generate more attention under 
the UNFCCC along the way. The UNFCCC climate 
regime and the Security Council have in common 
that they depend on cooperation with those national 
and international institutions that can contribute 
to the prevention of climate risks. Thus, the paper 
describes the overall global climate-related institu-
tional settings. 
Reducing climate-related risks is part of a preven-
tive foreign, security, and development policy. 
Whether the Security Council can and should develop 
further in this respect is discussed in a separate chap-
ter.15 Finally, options for Germany’s and the EU’s en-
gagement in 2020 and beyond are discussed. 
 
2019), https://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb12775e.pdf 
(accessed 2 March 2020). 
15 See chapter “The Role of the UN Security Council in 
Addressing Climate Risks”, pp. 36ff. 
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In 2009, the UNGA began to more broadly integrate 
climate change issues and impacts into the UN sys-
tem.16 In 2011, the Security Council commented on 
the role of the UN in preventive diplomacy, which 
should effectively help in avoiding conflicts. Accord-
ing to this comment, the task should be taken up by 
all UN institutions, not just the Security Council, and 
it should include early warnings, mediation, and 
peace missions. Conflict prevention strategies should 
comprehensively address the origins of conflicts and 
promote, among other things, sustainable develop-
ment, the rule of law, human rights, and other fun-
damental UN principles. The UN Secretary-General is 
called upon to use all the resources at his disposal for 
this purpose.17 
The mandate of the Security Council – 
subject to constant change 
According to Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, 
the UN Security Council is responsible for maintain-
ing international peace and security. Its decisions are 
binding for all members of the UN, even though only 
15 of them sit on the Council, five of them as perma-
nent members (P5 – China, France, United Kingdom, 
Russia, United States), which have veto power and can 
block certain decisions. The 10 remaining seats rotate 
 
16 See section “Climate change as a threat to human secu-
rity – report of the Secretary-General 2009”, pp. 20ff. 
17 UN Security Council (UNSC), “Security Council Pledges 
Strengthened UN Effectiveness in Preventing Conflict, In-
cluding through Use of Early Warning, Preventive Deploy-
ment, Mediation” (online), 22 September 2011, https://www. 
un.org/press/en/2011/sc10392.doc.htm (accessed 11 April 
2019). 
every two years according to regional proportional 
representation, and countries are elected to the Coun-
cil by the General Assembly (see Table 1, p. 8). Secu-
rity Council decisions on procedural matters must 
be supported by at least nine of the fifteen members. 
Decisions on all other matters require the approval 
of at least nine members, including all permanent 
members (Article 27, Charter). Each member has one 
vote.18 
When the Security Council was founded in October 
1945, military tasks and a narrow concept of security 
were the key issues. However, the Council has had 
to evolve under ever-changing circumstances; its 
mandate has become more comprehensive, and the 
influence and scope of its tasks with respect to crisis 
regions and armed conflicts have changed repeatedly 
against the global political backdrop. Ultimately, the 
changing relations between the P5 determine whether 
the Security Council is capable of acting at all and 
whether military means are applied. 
The Security Council has intervened in many con-
flicts since the 1960s with international peace mis-
sions (“Blue Helmets”). In the 1990s, after the end of 
the Cold War, the number and variety of tasks in-
creased further. Attempts at returning to the original 
narrow mandate failed.19 
 
18 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ 
ctc/uncharter.pdf (accessed 8 April 2019). 
19 Shirley V. Scott and Charlotte Ku, “The UN Security 
Council and Global Action on Climate Change”, in Climate 
Change and the UN Security Council, ed. Shirley V. Scott and 
Charlotte Ku (Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, 
2018), 1–24 (5). 
Climate Change Impacts and 
the UN Security Council – 
What Has Happened to Date 
Climate Change Impacts and the UN Security Council – What Has Happened to Date 
SWP Berlin 
Addressing the Risks of Climate Change 
June 2020 
12 
Table 2 
Debates on climate change and security in 
the UN Security Council 
2020  
April 22nd Security Council Arria-formula 
meeting on “Climate and security 
risks: The latest data” 
Organised by: Belgium, France, the 
Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ger-
many, Niger, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Tunisia, the United 
Kingdom, Vietnam 
2019  
January 25th Open debate on “Maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Addressing the impacts of climate-
related disasters on international 
peace and security”, S/PV.8451, 
pp. 2/83 
Host: Dominican Republic 
2018  
September 
26th 
First official meeting of the Group 
of Friends on Climate and Security 
on the margins of the UN General 
Assembly 
August 1st Official launch of the Group of 
Friends on Climate and Security by 
Germany and the Pacific state of 
Nauru 
July 11th Open debate on “Maintaining inter-
national peace and security: Under-
standing and addressing climate-
related security risks”, S/PV.8307, 
pp. 2/29 
Host: Sweden 
2017  
December 
20th 
Open debate on “Maintaining 
international peace and security. 
Addressing complex contemporary 
challenges to international peace 
and security”, S/PV.8144, pp. 2/67 
Host: Japan  
December 
14th 
Security Council Arria-formula 
meeting on “Climate change: 
Preparing for the security implica-
tions of rising temperatures”. 
April 10th Security Council Arria-formula 
meeting on “Security Implications 
of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise” 
Organised by: Ukraine 
 
2015  
July 30th Open debate on “Maintaining of inter-
national peace and security: Challenges 
for SIDS”, S/PV.7499, pp. 2/87 
Host: New Zealand 
June 30th Security Council Arria-formula meeting 
on “Climate change as a threat multi-
plier for global security” 
Organised by: Malaysia, Spain 
2013  
February 
15th 
Security Council meeting in Arria 
format on “Security dimensions of 
climate change” 
Organised by: Pakistan, United Kingdom 
2011  
July 20th Open debate on “Maintaining inter-
national peace and security: The effects 
of climate change”, S/PV.6587, p. 2 
Host: Germany 
Outcome: Statement by the President, 
S/PRST/2011/15 
2007  
April 10th First open debate on “Peace and 
security policy implications of climate 
change”, S/PV.5663, S/PV.5663 
(Resumption 1) 
Host: United Kingdom 
Outcome: No agreement on whether 
the Security Council is the right body 
to address climate change issues 
Sources: What’s in Blue, https://www.whatsinblue.org/2020/ 
04/arria-formula-meeting-on-climate-and-security-risks-the-
latest-data.php; United Nations, Digital Library, https:// 
digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en; Federal Foreign Office, “United 
Nations: Germany Initiates Group of Friends on Climate and 
Security”, 8 August 2018, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/ 
aussenpolitik/themen/klima/climate-and-security-new-group-of-
friends/2125682; Security Council Report, Arria-Formula Meet-
ings, 1992–2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ 
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ 
working_methods_arria_formula-16.pdf. 
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At the turn of the century, the fight against inter-
national terrorism became a top issue for the Coun-
cil. Also, the economic and political reconstruction of 
states has become part of the scope of many missions 
mandated by the Security Council; in some cases, 
missions in crisis-ridden regions have lasted for more 
than a decade.20 
The prospects of integrating the Security Council 
in the climate regime depend very much on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the body itself and less 
on the principles and foundations of the UN Charter. 
The body’s effectiveness hinges on the actual global 
political situation and the willingness for cooperation. 
The political dynamics between the members, above 
all the P5, and their interests in Security Council 
interventions determine to a large extent whether – 
and in what form – the Security Council can deal 
with aspects of climate change.21 
Security Council debates on climate 
change impacts 
Since 2006, other states and non-state actors have 
been considering how to assess the security policy 
implications of climate change. Margaret Beckett, 
then-British Foreign Secretary, was the first to do so.22 
In 2007, ex-generals in the United States defined cli-
mate change as a matter of national security in a 
report by the Center for Naval Analysis.23 In that year, 
the United Kingdom chaired an open debate in the 
UN Security Council for the first time that dealt with 
climate-related security-policy implications (see Table 
2, p. 12). This was followed by the Secretary-General’s 
report in 2009 and, under the German Presidency, a 
Security Council Presidential Statement on Climate 
Change in 2011. The statement declares that negative 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 For an up-to-date inventory of the tensions between 
the P5, see Richard Gowen, “Navigating the Storms at the 
UN Security Council”, International Crisis Group, 5 February 
2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/navigating-storms-
un-security-council (accessed 19 February 2020). 
22 “Margaret Beckett – 2006 Speech in Berlin”, 23 October 
2006, http://www.ukpol.co.uk/margaret-beckett-2006-speech-
in-berlin/ (accessed 20 January 2010). 
23 National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexan-
dria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2007), https://www. 
cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/National%20Security%20and%20the 
%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf (accessed 
8 August 2019). 
Table 3 
Resolutions and documents of the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly with 
references to the security implications of 
climate change 
Resolutions of the Security Council 
2017  
March 31th Resolution 2349 on the security 
situation in the Lake Chad Basin 
Region, S/RES/2349(2017) 
2018  
March 27th Resolution 2408 on the security 
situation in Somalia – Reaffirmation 
of the statement on the security im-
plications of climate change as set out 
in Resolution 2349 and the Presiden-
tial Statement of 30 January 2018, 
S/RES/2408(2018) 
July 30th Resolution 2431 on the situation in 
Somalia, S/RES/2431(2018) 
July 13th Resolution 2429 on the situation in 
Sudan, S/RES/2429(2018) 
June 28th Resolution 2423 on the situation in 
Mali, S/RES/2423(2018) 
Presidential Statements with reference to climate 
2018  
January 30th Presidential Statement on the activ-
ities of the UN Office for West Africa 
and the Sahel (UNOWAS) – Reaffir-
mation of the statement on security 
implications of climate change as set 
out in Resolution 2349, S/PRST/2018/3 
August 10th Presidential Statement on the Central 
Africa Region, S/PRST/2018/17 
August 10th Presidential Statement on Peacebuild-
ing in West Africa, S/PRST/2018/16 
Documents of the General Assembly 
2009  
June 3rd Resolution 63/281 on climate change 
and its possible security implications, 
A/RES/63/281 – calling on UN bodies 
to consider climate change issues 
within their mandates, requests the 
Secretary-General to submit a com-
prehensive report. 
September 
11th 
Report by the Secretary-General 
on climate change and its possible 
security implications, A/64/350 
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impacts of climate change could aggravate certain 
existing threats to international peace and security in 
the long term.24 The baton for debates in the Security 
Council on climate risks has been passed on since 
2011, and potential risks were also discussed in vari-
ous formats in 2013, 2015, and 2017. The Netherlands 
and Sweden invested a lot of political capital in 2017 
and 2018, and they held open debates on climate-
related security risks; the Dominican Republic took 
up the thread in January 2019. Under Germany’s 
Presidency of the Security Council, a further open 
debate is to be held in July 2020.25 In the course of 
this repeated exchange on the issue, five Security 
Council resolutions have stressed that climate change 
is a relevant issue for countries in which military con-
flicts persist, or which pose a threat to international 
security due to terrorist groups. In 2018, three state-
ments by the President of the Security Council in-
cluded corresponding references. 
A resolution is the Security Council’s strongest in-
strument. It is binding under international law and 
has to be adopted by at least nine members. Each of 
the P5 must either agree or abstain; a negative vote by 
one of them acts as a veto. A statement by the President 
requires the consensus of all members; it is adopted 
in a public session.26 A note from the President or a letter 
from the President is based on consensus in an informal 
consultation or on a “no objection procedure”. A press 
release of the President is the result with the lowest pro-
file and is adopted by consensus.27 
Parallel to the efforts to pass the resolutions, 
Sweden initiated a small group of experts in 2017, 
which was then expanded by Germany in 2018. They 
help to provide specific information for the UN Secu-
 
24 UNSC, “Statement by the President of the Security 
Council”, S/PRST/2011/15 (20 July 2011), https://undocs.org/ 
S/PRST/2011/15 (accessed 20 January 2020). 
25 See also Scott and Ku, “The UN Security Council and 
Global Action on Climate Change” (see note 19). The Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Planetary Security 
Initiative (PSI) (https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org) in 
2015 as a platform for various governmental and civil society 
actors from climate and security networks. PSI participated 
in the networking conference of the German Federal Foreign 
Office in Berlin in June 2019. 
26 2011 the Security Council, under German chairman-
ship, adopted a Presidential Statement on climate and security. 
27 UNSC, Major Types of Actions Taken by the Security Council 
(New York, NY, compiled January 2018), https://www.un.org/ 
securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/ 
actions.pdf (accessed 5 August 2019). 
rity Council on climate security risks. In order to 
increase the capacity for informing the Security Coun-
cil also on-site in New York, the Swedish government 
is funding three additional posts, which have been 
based at the Secretary-General’s Department of Politi-
cal Affairs since the end of 2018. These posts, known 
as the Climate and Security Mechanism, are staffed 
by the DPPA, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 
and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). Sweden will finance this mechanism for three 
years. A further post, also at the DPPA, was added by 
Belgium for one year.28 
 
28 Dan Smith, Malin Mobjörk, Florian Krampe, and Karo-
lina Eklöw, Climate Security. Making It Doable, Clingendael 
Report (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations, February 2019, 2, https://www.sipri.org/sites/ 
default/files/2019-02/climatesecurity_makingit_doable_ 
latest.pdf.pagespeed.ce_.naqctbogs7.pdf (accessed 22 August 
2019). 
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Box 1 
Security concepts 
Various concepts of security exist in debates about the role of 
the UN Security Council for climate-related security issues.a 
Based on the 1945 mandate of the body, the concept of inter-
national security focuses on military tasks. According to this 
concept, the Security Council should prevent or end armed 
conflicts between states. In the more than 70 years of the Coun-
cil’s existence, however, other security concepts have emerged. 
In particular since the 1980s, concepts – and with them the 
approaches to action – have changed. The range of challenges 
brought to the Council has grown; economic and ecological 
issues have been added to the list of concerns; and domestic 
triggers for security risks, such as migration and forced dis-
placement, human rights violations and epidemics, have been 
identified as important security-related issues.b 
In 1994, the “New Dimensions of Human Security” report of 
UNDP not only questioned whether the development of coun-
tries can be measured by key economic data alone; it also led to 
a further development of the concept of security. From this, a 
“third generation” of ideas on how security should be defined 
came about, framing the concept of human security.c It puts the 
individual, not only the state, at the centre of security policy, 
taking into account that, in specific constellations, the interest 
in state sovereignty should come second to the interest of pro-
tecting individuals.d In this respect, three responsibilities have 
been developed under the UN since its founding: 1. human 
rights protection, including fundamental rights – such as 
physical integrity – as well as legal and political interests; 
2. protection against military threats (freedom from fear). In-
dividuals and groups are to be protected in case of wars and  
 
 other violent conflicts; 3. protection against non-military threats 
(freedom from want). Individuals and groups should be pro-
tected from emergencies caused by natural disasters, epidemics, 
and other crisis situations posing an existential threat.e This 
aspect, which was particularly emphasised by UNDP in 1994, 
also includes a claim to equal economic opportunity and secu-
rity of supply. 
While the normative debate on the approach continues, the 
concept of human security has become established in international 
politics.f The United Nations’ definition of human security 
(Resolution 66/290, 2012), however, is very broad, namely as 
“the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from 
poverty and despair”.g There is as yet no consensus among UN 
member states to further narrow down the concept. 
The human security approach provides orientation; never-
theless, it repeatedly poses challenges to the UN Security Coun-
cil. The most controversial issue is whether the Council should 
take preventive action. One line of argument is based on how 
international security is defined, namely as the absence of 
threats to states and the use of military force. This requires the 
stability of political, social, and military systems.h If this line 
of argument is continued, the Security Council should also take 
stabilising measures to guarantee international security and 
ensure human security. However, since the instruments that 
the Security Council can apply are primarily of a military 
nature, the discussion on a preventive role is politically charged. 
This has an impact on debates aimed at maintaining human 
security in general, and at dealing with climate risks in par-
ticular. 
a Jörn Richert, “Der Stabilitätsbegriff als leitendes Konzept 
der Klima-Sicherheits-Debatte”, in Klimawandel und Sicherheit. 
Herausforderungen, Reaktionen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten, 
ed. Steffen Angenendt, Susanne Dröge and Jörn Richert (Baden-
Baden, 2011), 40–55 (44). 
b Thomas Debiel and Sascha Werthes, “Menschliche Sicher-
heit: Fallstricke eines wirkungsmächtigen Konzepts”, in Ver-
unsicherte Gesellschaft – Überforderter Staat. Zum Wandel 
der Sicherheitskultur, ed. Christopher Daase, Stefan Engert and 
Julian Junk (Frankfurt, 2013), 319–36 (321). 
c Ibid. 
d From this the “Responsibility to Protect” emerged. This 
principle provides for a state to intervene in another state if 
the latter and the UN Security Council are unable to end an ex-
treme humanitarian disaster. Charlotte Ku, “The UN Security 
Council’s Role in Developing a Responsibility to Respond to 
the Climate Change Challenge”, in Climate Change and the UN  
 Security Council, ed. Shirley V. Scott and Charlotte Ku (Chelten-
ham, 2018), 162–85 (175). 
e Christopher K. Penny, “Human Security”, in The Oxford 
Handbook on the United Nations, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam 
Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 635–51. 
f Ibid.; Achim Steiner, “25th Anniversary of the Human Secu-
rity Concept”, UNDP. Keynote Speech, posted 28 February 2019, 
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/news-centre/ 
speeches/2019/25th-anniversary-of-the-human-security-
concept.html (accessed 22 July 2019). 
g UNGA, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 
10th December 2012, A/RES/66/290, 3. (a), (New York, NY, 
25 October 2012). 
h Gebhard Geiger, “Klimawandel – Ein Fall für internationale 
Sicherheitspolitik?” in Klimawandel und Sicherheit, ed. Ange-
nendt et al. (see note a), 21–39 (25). 
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The expectation that unchecked climate change could 
also affect international security was first addressed at 
the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere 
in 1988.29 The same year, the UN General Assembly 
declared climate change to be a “common concern of 
mankind”.30 The extent to which it could act as a threat 
multiplier was further explained in the UN Secretary-
General’s report in 2009. Subsequently, this issue has 
increasingly been the subject of scientific research. 
Only a few studies show that climate change can 
directly trigger violent conflicts.31 A large number 
of studies, however, find that links exist between cli-
mate change impacts and violent conflicts or how 
these could intensify in the future. Whereas a direct 
causality can bring the UN Security Council into the 
picture, this is more difficult for indirect effects.32 
Indirect causality, however, can lead to making a case 
for assigning a preventive role to the Security Council 
and for assigning responsibility to other UN institu-
tions as well as to state and non-state actors at the 
national level. 
 
29 Peter Usher, “World Conference on the Changing 
Atmosphere. Implications for Global Security”, Environment: 
Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 31, no. 1 (1989): 
25ff. As early as 1979 the World Meteorological Organi-
zation, based on its early warning system for extreme 
weather events, had pointed out the risk potential of climate 
change. World Meteorological Organization, WMO Briefing to 
UNSC (New York, NY, 2019), https://ane4bf-datap1.s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/wmocms/s3fs-public/ckeditor/files/WMO_ 
Briefing_to_UNSC_Final_25_Jan_2019_1.pdf?HMs2EFR5zq5
W5ZIp9L3V1YDHjgRJDw2J (accessed 20 January 2020). 
30 UNGA, Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future 
Generations of Mankind (New York, NY, 6 December 1988), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00eff430.html (accessed 
19 February 2020). 
31 Katharine J. Mach et al., “Climate As a Risk Factor 
for Armed Conflict”, Nature 571, no. 7764 (2019): 193–97. 
32 See section “The mandate of the Security Council – 
subject to constant change”, pp. 10ff. 
Climate change as a threat to human secu-
rity – report of the Secretary-General 2009 
Two years after the first UN Security Council’s open 
debate on climate change, then-Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon published a report in 2009 (see Table 3, 
p. 13) summarising the state of knowledge on climate 
change impacts. UN member states had made exten-
sive submissions to contribute to this report,33 which 
focuses on the interactions between human vulnera-
bility and national security. The report also establish-
es a link to the international security threat posed by 
climate change. It identifies five channels in which 
global warming can affect human security: 
∎ Vulnerability: Threats to food security and health 
and increased exposure to extreme weather events 
(climate-impacts channel). 
∎ Development: If climate change slows down or re-
verses development processes, the vulnerability of 
states will increase and their capacity to maintain 
stability will decrease (peace and security channel). 
∎ Coping and security: The responses of households 
and communities to climate-related threats – for 
example, through migration or competition for na-
tural resources – can increase the risk of national 
conflicts and also have international repercussions 
(environmental-security channel). 
∎ Statelessness: When national territories disappear, 
this has implications for the rights, security, and 
sovereignty of the states concerned. 
 
33 UNGA, Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications. 
Report of the Secretary-General (Follow-up to the outcome of the 
Millennium Summit), no. A/64/350 (New York, NY, 11 Sep-
tember 2009), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ 
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/sg 
%20report%202009.pdf (accessed 9 April 2019). 
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∎ International conflict: Climate change impacts on 
shared or not demarcated international resources can 
have consequences for international cooperation.34 
The report also highlighted the measures that 
could reduce the threats. These include in particular 
adaptation to climate change, economic develop-
ment, better governance, capacity-building, climate 
change mitigation, and conflict prevention. These 
threat minimisers are also part of the 2030 Agenda and 
the SDGs adopted in 201535 and served Secretaries-
General Ban Ki-moon and António Guterres as the 
basis for their commitment to support the Paris 
Agreement negotiations and its subsequent imple-
mentation. The Fifth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), pub-
lished in 2014, also addresses climate change impli-
cations for human security.36 The Secretary-General’s 
2009 report was a decisive push from the General 
Assembly to deliver knowledge and reasons for the 
future engagement of the UN Security Council. 
Links between climate impacts and 
violent conflicts 
The most comprehensive review of the literature on 
the connections between climate risks and conflicts 
was conducted by Sakaguchi et al. (2018). In their 
meta-study, they cluster the findings from 69 refereed 
publications into four categories37: 
1. Direct link: Climate variables lead directly to forms 
of violence (“climate wars”). 
 
34 Ibid. 
35 United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1 (New York, NY, 2015), 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/ 
migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_
E.pdf (accessed 23 August 2019). 
36 W. Neil Adger and Juan M. Pulhin, “Human Security. 
Chapter 12”, in Fifth Assessment Report AR5. Working Group II, 
ed. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
(2014), 758–91. 
37  For this purpose, the authors evaluate publications that 
were peer reviewed, refer to the connection between climate 
change and violence, are based on primary data, and explain 
their case selection. Kendra Sakaguchi, Anil Varughese, and 
Graeme Auld, “Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Em-
pirical Analyses on the Links between Climate Change and 
Violent Conflict”, International Studies Review 19, no. 4 (2017): 
622–45 (623f.). 
2. Interactive path: Climate variables influence eco-
nomic factors, resources, or migration processes, 
and this affects the use of violence. 
3. Mediative path: Climate variables are mediated by 
other conditions – for example, socio-economic or 
institutional structures – and this influences the 
exercising of violence. 
4. Interactive and mediative pathways combined: (2) and 
(3) impact the use of violence as a consequence of 
climate change. 
Statements about direct relationships (category 1) 
have so far been based mainly on theoretical assump-
tions. Examples are that the aggressive behaviour of 
individuals could change as a result of extreme weather 
conditions, and that climate phenomena – such 
as El Niño, the cyclical warming of the East Pacific 
Ocean off the coast of South America – could be-
come decisive factors in conflict situations. According 
to the authors, there are only a small number of 
interstate conflicts that studies have investigated. 
They conclude that climate change contributes 
mainly indirectly to violent conflicts at the national 
and sub-national levels. Moreover, the effects are not 
one-dimensional.38 Many studies analyse how climate 
change phenomena interact with other factors 
(categories 2, 3, and 4). 
The majority of the analyses evaluated show that 
economic and resource-related variables that change 
due to climate change can lead to violence. In econo-
mies that are particularly dependent on fisheries, 
agriculture, or forestry, climate impacts can contrib-
ute to rivalries that encourage violence. If social ten-
sions arise, the extent to which social institutions and 
state governance are able to absorb negative effects is 
important. The decisive factors are existing govern-
ance structures, social systems, and other institution-
al and financial resources for dealing with indirect 
climate impacts. Migration, for example, can be a 
trigger for violence, according to the evaluated litera-
ture. This is the case when state, regional, and social 
capacities are lacking to help receive and integrate 
refugees or to help deter them.39 
 
38 Ibid., 628. 
39 Ibid., 632. 
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Climate impacts increase socio-
economic and resource stress – 
both of which can exacerbate 
existing conflicts. 
A special significance was assumed for the im-
pact of economic factors regarding outbreaks of vio-
lence – 52 per cent of the literature examined by 
Sakaguchi et al. worked with this assumption.40 This 
goes back to the fact that poverty is an established 
determinant of conflict, which is also emphasised in 
the security policy literature. On the one hand, eco-
nomic factors act through different mechanisms. In 
the 1990s Thomas Homer-Dixon analysed the links 
between environmental pollution and conflicts. His 
finding was that resource scarcities can act as conflict 
drivers.41 Other research on the impact of environ-
mental degradation on conflicts describes the role of 
economic transformation as a driver – for example, 
in the transition from subsistence farming to a mar-
ket economy. It is not disputed whether economic 
factors can have such effects, but how strong these 
effects are. This is because the political and economic 
conditions under which structural change takes place 
can absorb or intensify the environmental impacts 
on conflict situations. The abundance of resources 
can also promote outbreaks of violence, namely 
when actors want to secure access to the associated 
revenues.42 
Direct conflicts over sources of income often 
become violent when ethnic and political conflicts 
exist beforehand. Schleussner et al. have evaluated 
data on countries with ethnic conflicts and have 
shown that climate-induced natural disasters can 
have a negative impact on existing conflicts. The 
study examined outbreaks of violence in ethnically 
divided states between 1980 and 2010; in more than 
23 per cent of the cases, a robust relation to climate-
induced stress was found, which was transmitted via 
various mechanisms.43 In another study, Uexkull et 
 
40 Ibid., 633. 
41 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and 
Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
42 An overview of environmental conflict research can 
be found in: German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(WBGU), World in Transition: Climate Change As a Security Risk, 
Flagship Report (Berlin, 2008), https://www.wbgu.de/en/ 
publications/publication/welt-im-wandel-sicherheitsrisiko-
klimawandel (accessed 4 May 2020). 
43 Carl-Friedrich Schleussner, Jonathan F. Donges, Reik V. 
Donner, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, “Armed-Conflict 
al. found that droughts in very poor countries in Asia 
and Africa are highly likely to lead to violent conflicts 
among politically weak groups that are primarily 
dependent on agricultural income. In other cases, this 
does not occur, at least not in the short term. It can 
be established that droughts and violence interact in 
a reciprocal way, meaning that groups of populations 
become vulnerable to one phenomenon when hit by 
the other phenomenon.44 
An expert survey45 yields similar insights into con-
flict drivers and the uncertainties associated with 
them, as does the literature review by Sakaguchi et al. 
The experts highlight that the four strongest drivers 
are a low level of economic development, low level 
of state capacity, inequality, and a recent history of 
violent conflicts. In addition, the economic condition 
of a country has the strongest forecast value with 
regard to internal conflicts. However, this is connected 
to the uncertainty of whether this situation only leads 
to outbreaks of violence in conjunction with other 
mechanisms or whether it is a direct trigger. Climatic 
changes and climate change only rank 14th; they are 
classified as factors with the highest level of uncer-
tainty. 
Forecasts and the “streetlight effect” 
Of particular interest to security policy decision-makers 
are forecasts and early warning indicators that could 
help to prepare for climate impacts. There are a num-
ber of special features here. For example, it is not 
clear how different conflict parties perceive the changes 
in their climatic environments and how they are 
affected by them. In the future, new mechanisms 
(such as information technology or access to weapons) 
may also play a role in increasing the risk of con-
flict.46 Even greater uncertainties come into play for 
policy-makers with respect to unprecedented dimen-
sions of climate impacts, in particular physical tipping 
 
Risks Enhanced by Climate-Related Disasters in Ethnically 
Fractionalized Countries”, Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America 113, no. 33 (2016): 
9216–221. 
44 Nina von Uexkull, Mihai Croicu, Hanne Fjelde, and Hal-
vard Buhaug, “Civil Conflict Sensitivity to Growing-Season 
Drought”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 113, no. 44 (2016): 12391–396. 
45 Mach et al., “Climate As a Risk Factor for Armed Con-
flict” (see note 31), 196. 
46 Ibid. 
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points such as the melting of the Arctic or the drying 
out of the Amazon rainforest – both coming with 
the irreversible acceleration of warming, coined the 
“Hothouse Earth” pathway.47 
Conclusions from past conflict experiences do 
not offer direction, because the interrelationships 
between climate impacts and socio-economic devel-
opments depend on a multitude of factors – the 
global economic situation, changes in governmental 
options for action and ideology, as well as the inter-
national order and cooperation within the UN sys-
tem.48 Future research will most likely not focus on 
past conflicts alone as being the catalysts for out-
breaks of violence. New approaches are needed that 
systematically search for predictive factors of conflict 
and do not limit themselves to the nation-state as 
a territorial entity.49 Models that capture the local 
impacts of extreme weather events with high levels 
of accuracy50 can provide important information on 
expected climate risks and be linked to existing socio-
economic and political constellations. Many data sets 
from international organisations already capture 
these constellations and trends. However, research on 
climate-induced future conflicts is still in its infancy, 
as the availability, resolution, and quality of data for 
many world regions still need to be improved. The 
database on the use of force would also have to be 
expanded.51 
Studies on the causal relationship between climate 
risks and violent conflicts also have further systematic 
gaps. The majority of case studies focus on a few hot-
spots, especially on the African continent; they look 
disproportionately into English-speaking and politi-
cally more open countries, such as Kenya and South 
Africa, or at African states where violent conflicts 
already exist (“streetlight effect”52).53 A comparison 
 
47 Will Steffen et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System 
in the Anthropocene”, Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 2 (2018), doi: 10.1073/pnas.1810141115. 
48 Mach et al., “Climate As a Risk Factor for Armed Con-
flict” (see note 31), 196. 
49 Chris Perry, “Machine Learning and Conflict Prediction. 
A Use Case”, Stability: International Journal of Security & Develop-
ment 2, no. 3 (2013): 1–18 (4). 
50 For further information see ISIMIP, “The Inter-Sectoral 
Impact Model Intercomparison Project”, https://www.isimip. 
org/about/ (accessed 12 April 2019). 
51 Perry, “Machine Learning and Conflict Prediction” 
(see note 49), 4, 15. 
52 The effect describes a distorted approach in the search 
for solutions or scientific answers. The term is based on the 
by Adams et al. (2018) shows that most studies in 
climate conflict literature investigate Kenya, Sudan, 
Egypt, India, Nigeria, Syria, Israel/Palestine, Ethiopia, 
Iraq, and South Sudan.54 However, it is other coun-
tries that have been ranked first to tenth in the Ger-
manwatch Climate Risk Index over the last 20 years, 
namely Puerto Rico, Myanmar, Haiti, the Philippines, 
Pakistan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Thailand, Nepal, and 
Dominica.55 
In order to close knowledge gaps, information and 
data have yet to be collected for many countries, and 
access to them has to be established. Narrow metho-
dological approaches also need to be reassessed.56 Last 
but not least, the generation of new knowledge should 
also be guided by the question of why violent con-
flicts do not occur in certain states and regions, even 
though particularly high climate risks exist or are 
highly likely. 
 
image of searching for a lost key. The searcher is restricted 
to the best lit spot. See David H. Freedman, “Why Scientific 
Studies Are So Often Wrong: The Streetlight Effect”, Discover, 
10 December 2010, http://discovermagazine.com/2010/jul-
aug/29-why-scientific-studies-often-wrong-streetlight-effect 
(accessed 20 January 2020). 
53 Ken Conca, “Is There a Role for the UN Security Council 
on Climate Change?” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustain-
able Development 6, no. 1 (2019): 4–15. 
54 Courtland Adams, Tobias Ide, Jon Barnett and Adrien 
Detges, “Sampling Bias in Climate-Conflict Research”, Nature 
Climate Change 127, no. 8 (2018): 200–203. 
55 David Eckstein, Vera Künzel, Laura Schäfer, and Maik 
Winges, Global Climate Risk Index 2020 (Bonn, December 2019), 
https://germanwatch.org/en/17307 (accessed 4 May 2020). 
56 Adams et al., “Sampling Bias in Climate-Conflict 
Research” (see note 54). 
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In development policy analyses, extreme weather 
events and associated supply crises represent a high 
security risk for states and their populations. As the 
aim of such studies is to help manage short-term 
emergencies, the long-term conflict potential of the 
disasters is often neglected. The ranking of states 
that are particularly threatened by extreme weather 
changes each year. The 2017 Germanwatch Climate 
Risk Index lists Puerto Rico, Sri Lanka, Dominica, 
Nepal, Peru, Vietnam, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, 
Bangladesh, and Thailand as the top 10. The high-
ranking countries in 2018 were Japan, the Philip-
pines, Germany, Madagascar, India, Sri Lanka, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Canada, and Fiji.57 For this index, extreme 
weather events such as droughts, tropical storms, tor-
nadoes, floods, landslides, and forest fires are eval-
uated together with their socio-economic effects.58 
The early warning systems of international humani-
tarian aid institutions identify states that are particu-
larly exposed to existential emergencies following 
extreme weather events. Climate change increases the 
probability that the frequency and interaction of such 
events will increase.59 As a glance at the data shows, 
 
57 Eckstein et al., Global Climate Risk Index 2020 (see note 55). 
Germany is listed due to the summer heat wave in 2019, 
which caused 1,200 deaths, as well as storms with high 
levels of damage. 
58 Based on the “NatCatSERVICE” Munich Re database. See 
David Eckstein, Marie-Lena Hutfils, and Maik Winges, Global 
Climate Risk Index 2019. Who Suffers Most From Extreme Weather 
Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2017 and 1998 to 2017 
(Bonn, December 2018), 5, https://germanwatch.org/sites/ 
germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20 
Index%202019_2.pdf (accessed 25 January 2019). 
59 An overview of the impacts and risks that come with 
global warming can be found in IPCC, Global Warming of 
1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming 
populous and fragile states in Africa and Asia often 
have the highest risk constellation. Burundi, Equa-
torial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Mauritania, Niger, 
Syria, and Timor-Leste, for example, would not be 
able to cope with additional stress from climate risks. 
Among the small island states, Haiti also belongs to 
the category of fragile countries. It is repeatedly de-
vastated by hurricanes, and the Haitian government 
has too little capacity for disaster relief and recon-
struction.60 
A 2018 study by the United States Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID) sheds light on the 
interactions between fragility and climate impacts 
from a global perspective. It provides a good overview 
of risk constellations that are important from a pre-
ventive and security policy perspective. Based on a 
set of indicators, the analysis shows in which regions 
state fragility61 coincides with multiple climate risks 
 
of 1.5°C above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global 
Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, 
and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (Summary for Policymakers, 
(2018), 11, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/ 
05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf (accessed 20 January 
2020). 
60 Around 800,000 Haitians (8 per cent of the population) 
are particularly hard hit by recurring hurricanes. The coun-
try has the lowest per capita income in Latin America and is 
not politically stable. In 2010, it was hit by earthquakes and 
epidemics, and in 2016 by a severe hurricane. Katey Hearth, 
“2019 Hurricane Season Adds to Haiti’s Drought, Food Short-
age Woes”, Mission Network News (online), 16 August 2019, 
https://www.mnnonline.org/news/2019-hurricane-season-
adds-to-haitis-drought-food-shortage-woes/ (accessed 16 
August 2019). 
61 USAID defines fragility in the study along the lines of 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of a state in four core areas: 
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and where a large number of people are – or a high 
proportion of the population is – affected by this 
constellation. Interacting extreme weather events 
include cyclones, floods, forest fires, heavy rainfall, 
chronic droughts, and storms and sea-level rise on 
low-lying coasts. Data on repeated incidents of this 
type have been used and also provide indications of 
which regions are at high risk of future damages.62 
Table 4 shows fragile regions and countries in 
which the population is very strongly affected by 
various extreme weather events in terms of both total 
numbers and proportions (first column). These in-
clude – in absolute terms – parts of India, Egypt, 
Burma, and other countries. In Sierra Leone, Cam-
bodia, Egypt, and other countries, a high proportion 
of the total population is affected (second column). 
 
political indicators (including governance, participation), 
security (including the share of military expenditure in gross 
national product), economic, and social (including supply 
situations). See Ashley Moran, Joshua W. Busby, Clionadh 
Raleigh, Todd G. Smith, Roudabeh Kishi, Nisha Krishnan, 
and Charles Wight, The Intersection of Global Fragility and Cli-
mate Risks (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2018), 9, https://pdf. 
usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TBFH.pdf?mc_cid=9a663aa12f 
&mc_eid=01f8691c16 (accessed 1 October 2018). 
62 Ibid. 
Table 5 lists countries and territories with a small 
total population in which a very high proportion of 
the population could be affected by multiple climate 
impacts. Suriname, Guyana, the Maldives, the Mar-
shall Islands, and Kiribati of the SIDS group are on 
this list. The Netherlands also falls into this category, 
as do the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and the 
Cocos Islands, which belong to Australia. 
The USAID study shows that the vulnerability of 
the countries or the parts of the population affected 
by climate change can be established. What cannot be 
predicted, however, is the ultimate impact of the risk 
constellations, that is, whether existing conflicts will 
intensify or new ones will emerge. This requires an 
in-depth examination of other factors, including eco-
nomic, ethnic-cultural, and institutional constella-
tions.63 
 
63 See section “Links between climate impacts and violent 
conflicts”, pp. 21ff. 
Table 4 
Highly fragile states with large populations or with territory in very high exposure areas 
More than 1 million people in very high 
exposure areas (in millions, rounded) 
More than 10 per cent of population 
in very high exposure areas 
5 per cent or more of the territory 
in very high exposure areas 
India  44.1 Cambodia 20% Sierra Leone  18% 
Egypt  13.7 Mauritania 18% Cambodia  11% 
Burma  8.0 Egypt 16% Guinea-Bissau  9% 
Nigeria  4.5 Burma 15% Burma  5% 
Cambodia  3.1 Sierra Leone 11%  
Iraq  2.3 Libya 11% 
Pakistan  1.7  
Iran  1.1 
Colombia  1.0 
Note: “Highly fragile states” are defined here as those that were classified in the “highest” and “high” fragility categories  
in 2014; this includes only countries with populations over 500,000. “Very high exposure” areas are four standard  
deviations or more above the global mean exposure. The sources used are from 2016. 
Source: Moran et al., The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks (see note 61), Table 5, p. 13. 
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Table 5 
Top 15 countries or territories with largest share of population in  
very high exposure areas (in per cent) 
Cayman Islands 88 Bahrain 44 
Suriname 71 Marshall Islands 41 
Cocos Islands (Australia) 70 Kiribati 41 
Guyana 69 Vietnam 41 
United Arab Emirates 47 Caribbean/Pacific Islands of the United States 40 
Maldives 45 Bangladesh 33 
Netherlands 45 Northern Mariana Islands (USA) 32 
Turks and Caicos Islands (United Kingdom) 44   
Source: Moran et al., The Intersection of Global Fragility and Climate Risks (see note 61), Table 8, p. 31. 
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We have seen that climate impacts primarily affect 
the security situation of fragile states. However, it is 
the island states – most of which do not belong to 
the group of fragile states – that are committed to 
making the UN Security Council pay more attention 
to climate-related risks. What is behind this commit-
ment? In order to answer this question, we need to 
take a closer look at the history of international cli-
mate negotiations and how the UN climate regime 
addresses the consequences of climate change. 
Climate impacts and the UNFCCC 
According to Article 2, the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC is to achieve the stabilisation of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system.64 In the Paris Agreement of 
2015, this level was determined as a limit for the rise 
in the global mean temperature, which has to be kept 
well below 2 degrees Celsius, and efforts should be 
made to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Global warm-
ing has accelerated in recent years; this has become 
particularly clear with the recent heatwaves, but also 
from the increase in other extreme weather events 
and the melting of the Arctic ice. The preventive 
approach of the UNFCCC from the 1990s to stop fur-
ther climate change and associated risks has failed. 
Many states have anticipated this and insisted on 
negotiating also about the necessary adaptation to 
climate change.65 In parallel, addressing climate im-
pacts has gradually become more broadly established 
within the UN system (see Box 2, p. 25). But it was 
 
64 United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (New York, NY, 1992), available at https:// 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed 4 May 
2020). 
65 Ibid., 21. 
not until 2010, at COP16 in Cancún, Mexico, that a 
separate negotiating track on loss and damage was 
launched. Until then, the question of whether climate 
change would lead to irreversible impacts was con-
sidered an issue for the negotiation track on adap-
tation measures. Since Cancún, the definition of such 
losses and damages has been the key topic of discus-
sion.66 In 2013, the Warsaw International Mechanism 
was created as a separate forum for loss and damage. 
The Paris Agreement includes both adaptation to 
climate change and the management of losses and 
damages. Although this step was overdue, it could 
not be taken for granted; given that climate protec-
tion has been the centre of negotiations for many 
years, putting an emphasis on preventing the adap-
tation to – as well as losses and damages from – 
climate change. 
In light of the fact that global warming amounts 
already to around 1 degree Celsius compared to pre-
industrial levels,67 the SIDS and other vulnerable 
developing countries urged in the Paris Agreement 
negotiations that efforts be made to limit this in-
crease not only to “well below” 2 degrees but to 1.5 
degrees Celsius (Article 2[a], PA).68 Even with average 
global warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius, sea level rise 
will lead to shrinking territories by the end of the 
century, and the quality of the soil – mainly due to 
salinisation – will decline; at 2 degrees, even more 
serious consequences are to be expected.69 
 
66 Sönke Kreft, Koko Warner, Sven Harmeling, and Erin 
Roberts, “Framing the Loss and Damage Debate: A Thought 
Starter by the Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries 
Initiative”, in Climate Change: International Law and Global Gov-
ernance, vol. 2: Policy, Diplomacy and Governance in a Changing 
Environment, ed. Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann and 
Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting (Baden-Baden, 2013), 827–42, 
doi: 10.5771/9783845242774_827. 
67 IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C (see note 59). 
68 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement (see note 3). 
69 IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C (see note 59) 7, B.2. 
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The parties to the Paris Agreement were able to 
enshrine the concern of the SIDS and other vulner-
able countries in Article 8 PA, which also met with 
US approval. The United States and oil-rich countries 
such as Saudi Arabia are very critical of the debate 
on loss and damage because they fear being held 
liable for their past and future contributions to cli-
mate change. Their consent in Paris was possible 
because the focus of Article 8 is not on liability issues, 
but on further processes and the exchange of infor-
mation. Article 8 does not provide a definition of 
what is meant by loss and damage. Instead, it focuses 
on the following: It is recognised that the prevention 
of loss and damage from climate change and sustain-
able development are important for risk minimisa-
tion (Article 8.1); the WIM is to be further negotiated 
by the parties (Article 8.2); the understanding of loss 
and damage, action, and mutual support is to be 
expanded (Article 8.3). Article 8.4 lists various areas 
for further cooperation where knowledge, measures, 
and support could be improved, for example early 
warning systems, risk management, and slow onset 
events (such as sea-level rise) and extreme weather, as 
well as losses that cannot be quantified economically. 
Climate financing and liability issues 
The call for financial and technical assistance to deal 
with climate impacts gained traction at the 2007 Bali 
negotiations (COP13), where the G77 developing 
countries insisted on this point. The Bali Action Plan 
then established adaptation – along with climate 
protection, technical assistance, and financial aid – 
as one of four pillars for a future climate regime to be 
negotiated as the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. At 
COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, a total volume of $100 
billion was introduced into the debate as a number; 
this sum was regarded as necessary from 2020 on-
wards to support the developing countries with their 
climate policies, in particular adaptation. The amount 
was confirmed as a target in the Paris Agreement 
when the new regime was established, and it is to 
be further increased in the negotiations until 2025,70 
with funds coming from private and state sources. 
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) had already been 
established in 2010 to distribute public climate 
finance and use it as a lever for private investor par-
ticipation. Its funds are earmarked both for climate 
 
70 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement (see note 3), Decisions, no. 54. 
protection and adaptation measures – such as the 
construction of dikes and new agricultural cultiva-
tion methods. Vulnerable countries are, however, 
demanding that this fund also provide money for 
countries affected by loss and damage from climate 
change. Besides the GCF, various funds with relatively 
small volumes, such as the Adaptation Fund, also 
continue to exist. However, so far, loss and damage 
has not yet constituted a separate category in climate 
finance. At the 2019 negotiations, the vulnerable 
developing countries again proposed to set up a new 
facility under the WIM, which would receive addi-
tional funds. A new group of experts is to address 
these issues.71 
As the Bali Action Plan made clear, the SIDS, the 
Least Developed Countries, and other African states 
are considered particularly vulnerable countries. 
However, for reasons of political sensitivity, the G77 
has not pursued the idea of establishing a list under 
the UNFCCC which uses criteria that determine need, 
and thus would list the particular countries to be sup-
ported – despite mounting pressure to do so given 
loss and damage.72 It is both legally and technically 
difficult to connect climate risks and their impacts to 
specific polluters and their contributions to climate 
change (attribution), not to mention the political sen-
sitivities involved. For such an attribution, a legal 
claim for financial compensation has to be negotiated 
and anchored in international law as part of an agree-
ment. Moreover, methods are needed to measure and 
predict loss and damage. For many countries, the loss 
of identity and culture is also an issue – impacts that 
cannot be measured and quantified.73 
The only consensus achieved early on is that the 
responsibility for historical emissions – that is, those 
greenhouse gases that have already accumulated in 
the atmosphere – lies with the industrialised coun-
tries. This was already recognised in the Kyoto Proto-
col. The Paris Agreement also assigns responsibility to 
other countries – it calls on the emerging economies 
 
71 Jocelyn Timperley, “Cop25: What Was Achieved and 
Where to Next?”, Climate Home News, 16 December 2019, 
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/12/16/cop25-
achieved-next/ (accessed 14 January 2020). 
72 Mizan Khan, Stacy-ann Robinson, Romain Weikmans, 
David Ciplet, and J. Timmons Roberts, “Twenty-five Years of 
Adaptation Finance through a Climate Justice Lens”, Climatic 
Change 17, no. 8 (2019): 17, chap. 3.3. 
73 A new group of experts has also been set up (at COP25) 
to deal with issues relating to losses that cannot be measured 
economically. See Timperley, “Cop25” (see note 71). 
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to contribute to climate protection and to finance 
the climate policy of poor countries. Nevertheless, the 
industrialised countries are supposed to continue to 
make greater efforts to protect the climate than the 
developing countries and provide funds to support 
them. 
China is now the largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases and, together with other emerging economies, 
contributes significantly to global emissions. As part 
of the G77, vulnerable poor countries for the first 
time openly opposed Beijing’s request to continue 
being counted among the developing countries in 
2012 – developing countries do not have to contrib-
ute to climate protection in a binding way. Indeed, 
China later seemed to move away from this position. 
In the phase from 2014 to 2016, that is, shortly before 
and after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the 
Chinese government conceded to set an emissions 
target and contribute to the GCF together with the 
United States, albeit on a voluntary basis. Washing-
ton’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, 
has once again intensified the contention over finan-
cial aid for developing countries in climate negotia-
tions. Contrary to its own announcement, China 
has not paid into the GCF, and the gap of $2 billion 
left by the withdrawal of the United States has not 
yet been closed by other OECD members. As a con-
sequence, public climate financing has not been 
provided as promised. 
With this backdrop, it comes across as a very deli-
cate attempt to hold countries that are donors of 
official development aid accountable for losses and 
damages as well. This seems even more ambitious in 
light of the global situation in 2020 and the immense 
financial burdens looming from the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The United States has always spoken out 
against any liability obligations. They feared above all 
legally enforceable compensation claims for climate 
damages. Although China, contrary to the US govern-
ment, is facing up to the challenge of climate pro-
tection, it wants to remain part of the group of devel-
oping countries for economic and geopolitical 
reasons. India is aligning itself with the two major 
powers, and other emerging economies are behaving 
in a similar way. Also because of this situation, many 
vulnerable countries hope that a debate in the Secu-
rity Council on climate impacts and related risks can 
put more pressure on the United States, China, and 
Russia – which are among the world’s largest emit-
ters of CO2 – and slow down implementation of the 
Paris Agreement. The Security Council deliberations 
thus expand the international climate impact debate 
with a security policy component, in combination 
with the question of what a preventive policy address-
ing climate risks might look like. 
 
  
Box 2 
The UN system and climate policy issues 
More than 40 institutions in the United Nations system 
address climate issues directly and indirectly. Figure 1 
(p. 26) illustrates which of them are involved at each level 
of the UN system and how they are linked to the main 
UN organs. The UN system has six such main organs; four 
of them currently have a link to international climate 
policy.a 
The UNFCCC is primarily responsible for international 
climate policy and bringing together the various strands 
of climate activities at the international level. It is one of 
the secretariats of the United Nations. Under the umbrella 
of the UN General Assembly, funds and programmes are in-
volved in the implementation of climate policy goals – 
such as UNEP, UNDP, the Human Settlements Programme 
(UN-HABITAT), and the World Food Programme. The Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is home to the spe-
cialized agencies, such as the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, which is working on rules for reducing 
emissions from aviation; the World Bank Group, which 
manages various climate funds and sets up its own pro-
grammes; and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO), which is in charge of the global assessment re-
ports of the IPCC. The IPCC and other non-UN organisa-
tions provide scientific fundamentals and related infor-
mation. 
The Security Council is supported directly through its 
subsidiary bodies and through the Secretariats, including 
the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs of 
the Secretary-General (DPPA), the UN Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction, and the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs. In 2018, the DPPA took up the task 
of providing information on climate risks. 
The subsidiary bodies regularly formed by the Security 
Council include committees, peacekeeping operations, 
political missions, criminal tribunals, and commissions. 
They address climate-related issues once the Security 
Council has decided to include them in its decisions, for 
example in the fight against terrorism, peacekeeping 
operations, or other mandates. 
a The International Court of Justice is not listed, nor 
is the Trusteeship Council. The full chart of the UN sys-
tem can be found here: https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/un_ 
system_chart.pdf. 
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The UN Security Council can assume several func-
tions to contribute towards the further development 
of the international climate regime. Members have at 
their disposal the legal and technical means as well 
as the working methods to provide information and 
prepare the meetings and decisions of the Security 
Council. In theory, the range of possible decisions of 
the body ranges from a complete refusal to deal with 
climate change to the adoption of preventive climate 
policy measures.74 Resolutions are the strongest 
instrument available to the UN under international 
law. Before resorting to them, however, the Security 
Council could argue in favour of pooling risk assess-
ments and strengthening preventive UN policies. For 
all options, the caveat applies that a consensus is 
required in the first place. 
Firstly, by debating climate risks, the Security 
Council can generate more attention for the mounting 
pressures to act on climate change in the short term. 
Secondly, the security aspects of climate change im-
pacts can be given greater focus than is the case with 
the UNFCCC or other UN institutions where there is 
no primary security policy emphasis. In this respect, 
risk assessments and evaluations in the Security 
Council can complement those in the UNFCCC and 
other UN institutions. In the longer term, the quality 
of climate change impact assessments can also be 
improved if the relevant information from various 
UN agencies is brought together at the Security Coun-
cil. Thirdly, the Council is an additional venue for 
sounding out the interests of individual states in in-
ternational climate policy cooperation. Alliances can 
be built and intensified in order to achieve results 
 
74 Scott and Ku, “The UN Security Council and Global 
Action on Climate Change” (see note 19), 20f. 
that will feed into the international climate policy 
agenda. 
With respect to each of these functions, it is crucial 
that the Security Council deals with climate risks con-
tinuously. This continuity hinges on the commitment 
of individual members of the Council. Not least in 
view of the potential security risks that unchecked 
global warming could bring about, some US-based 
think tanks are calling for the Security Council to pre-
pare for such scenarios. 
Increase the level of attention 
Every debate held at the UN Security Council on cli-
mate change helps small island states, other vulner-
able countries, and their partners from emerging 
and industrialised countries to raise awareness about 
climate-related risks. In recent years, this special 
concern has been supported primarily by Germany, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
France. In the open debates, however, members of 
the Council regularly question whether the Security 
Council has any legitimate role in climate policy. 
Legitimacy is decisive if Security Council decisions 
are to have an impact on other UN member states.75 
It is about whether the parties to the UNFCCC, which 
are also UN member states, consider it legitimate 
for the Security Council to be dealing with climate 
change impacts, to tackle these impacts by including 
measures in resolutions, and thus to motivate the 
members of the Security Council to act, both to pre-
 
75 Martin Binder and Monika Heupel, “Contested Legiti-
macy. The UN Security Council and Climate Change”, in 
Climate Change and the UN Security Council, ed. Scott and Ku 
(see note 19), 186–208. 
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vent climate risks and deal with them. After all, the 
body’s decisions are ultimately implemented – 
and provided with resources – by national govern-
ments.76 Another limitation to the legitimacy of the 
Security Council is the uneven distribution of power 
among its members due to the P5’s veto right. Many 
countries see this as a critical issue, also in the 
context of climate debates. 
Since the Trump administration took 
office, the P5 have been even more 
deeply divided on climate policy. 
India, for example, reiterated in 2019 that it is 
questionable to shift climate lawmaking from the 
UNFCCC to “a structurally unrepresentative insti-
tution with an exclusionary approach decided in 
secretive deliberations”.77 India and other developing 
countries are therefore opposed to giving the Security 
Council a role in addressing climate change issues. 
They fear military responses under the guise of secur-
ing stability. Bolivia and Egypt, for example, have 
been particularly critical in this respect.78 
Since the Trump administration took office, the P5 
have been even more divided on climate policy than 
before. The US administration generally refuses to 
take climate policy measures and no longer partici-
pates in international climate cooperation, be it 
under the UN, the G7, the G20, or the Arctic Coun-
cil.79 The withdrawal of the United States from the 
Paris Agreement will become legally effective on 4 
November 2020. In the Security Council debate of 
January 2019, the US representative to the United 
Nations, Jonathan Cohen, avoided using the word 
“climate”. Nevertheless, he stressed the risks that 
natural disasters could pose to security policy. He 
added that members of the Security Council and UN 
 
76 Ibid., 202. 
77 United Nations, “Massive Displacement, Greater Compe-
tition for Scarce Resources Cited As Major Risks in Security 
Council Debate on Climate-Related Threats”, Press Release, 
25 January 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ 
sc13677.doc.htm (accessed 4 May 2020). 
78 Binder and Heupel, “Contested Legitimacy” (see note 75), 
198–202; United Nations, “Massive Displacement” 
(see note 77). 
79 “Arctic Council Fails to Agree on Declaration As US 
Holds Out on Climate Change”, Yle News, 7 May 2019, https:// 
yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/arctic_council_fails_to_agree_on_ 
declaration_as_us_holds_out_on_climate_change/10770803 
(accessed 4 May 2020). 
agencies should step up their efforts to ensure that 
relevant information is made available and best prac-
tices in post-disaster management are shared.80 It is 
difficult to assess what role the United States will play 
if there is another push for addressing climate risks 
via the Security Council. It is possible that Washing-
ton will abstain, but also that it will vote against new 
decisions. Russia has for years been opposed to the 
“securitisation” of climate change by framing it as a 
security policy issue. In Moscow’s view, it is excessive 
and counterproductive to deal with this issue in the 
UN Security Council.81 China, on the other hand, 
recently emphasised that climate change must be 
tackled through international cooperation, that UN 
agencies are responsible for this, that sustainable 
development is peacebuilding, and that the indus-
trialised countries should lead the fight against cli-
mate change.82 
The repositioning of the United States towards the 
climate regime has, however, contributed to the fact 
that the Netherlands and Sweden gave greater atten-
tion to the issue in the Security Council in 2017/2018. 
This commitment has shown that it is possible to 
continuously draw attention to climate risks and 
security-related policy issues in Security Council 
debates. However, it is unlikely that this experience 
will have an impact on the agendas of the United 
States, China, and Russia under the UNFCCC and up-
coming negotiations. Their positions in the Security 
Council are either purely security-related – this 
applies in particular to Russia – or, as in the case of 
China, are also driven by economic priorities. Since 
there are only 10 other members on the Security 
Council in addition to the P5, and not more than 190 
as in the General Assembly or ECOSOC, the lever of 
the “large number” to influence these three states 
in the Security Council is also missing. The P5 do not 
have to solicit the support of other states for their 
positions or – like Germany – face an election for a 
 
80 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks 
at a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Impacts of 
Climate Related Disasters on International Peace and Secu-
rity”, New York, NY, 25 January 2019, https://usun. 
usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-open-debate-
on-the-impacts-of-climate-related-disasters-on-international-
peace-and-security/ (accessed 29 January 2019). 
81 UNSC, Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8451 (New York, 
NY: United Nations, 25 January 2019), https://www.security 
councilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8451.pdf (accessed 4 May 2020). 
82 Ibid. 
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seat as a non-permanent member. Moreover, even 
Security Council members that are open to the cli-
mate debate are sceptical about the claim that the 
Security Council can influence the climate regime.83 
However, the “attention strategy” is gaining trac-
tion from the fact that more countries are stressing 
that their national security situations are also threat-
ened by climate change impacts. Sudan, for example, 
repeatedly refers to the outbreaks of violence in 
Darfur in 2003, where droughts had intensified the 
conflicts between groups competing for agriculture 
resources. Indonesia called on the Security Council 
to expand the capacities of military operations for 
“climate peace missions”. Indonesia also called for a 
clearer definition of when to talk about the security 
dimensions of climate change impacts and when not.84 
Focus and inform 
The UN Security Council could systematically evalu-
ate the concrete climate-related security policy risks 
and prepare a more in-depth risk analysis. This way, 
the knowledge base on which its open debates and 
recommendations for action to the Security Council 
are based could be expanded.85 The Security Council 
itself draws on analyses that are tailored to its pur-
poses. This task lies with the DPPA, which reports to 
the Secretary General.86 The DPPA would be respon-
sible, for example, if the Council wanted to examine 
the causalities between climate change impacts and 
a particular security situation, or examine requests 
establishing early warning systems that directly in-
form the Security Council. The additional posts at 
DPPA, UNEP, and UNDP, which were funded by the 
Swedish government in 2018, are intended to enable 
security risks to be addressed and risk assessments 
to be made. Belgium has contributed one additional 
post for one year.87 It is also intended that the 
 
83 Shirley V. Scott, “The Attitude of the P5 towards a Cli-
mate Change Role for the Council”, in Climate Change and the 
UN Security Council, ed. Scott and Ku (see note 19), 209–28 
(212f.). 
84 United Nations, “Massive Displacement” (see note 77). 
85 See section “Forecasts and the ‘streetlight effect’”, 
pp. 24ff. 
86 See Figure 1, p. 35. 
87 Together with the UN, the German government has 
launched a pilot project at the Horn of Africa to investigate 
the security risks of climate change. In Mogadishu, Somalia, 
it is financing the post of a UN expert on environment and 
analyses should be incorporated into the reports sub-
mitted to the Secretary-General.88 Also at the opera-
tional level of UN missions, preventive approaches 
and management strategies for climate-related risks 
are to be improved. In order to deliver on this plan, 
the head of DPPA calls on UN member states and 
other stakeholders to evaluate practical examples 
and share this information.89 
The Security Council can certainly become more 
relevant for the global climate regime if it focuses 
on risk assessment and prevention. In this way, the 
Council would go beyond the means it has at its dis-
posable and which define its role as a player sanction-
ing others (e.g. with trade sanctions aimed at terrorist 
groups) – let alone that a sanctioning role with 
respect to climate action is not regarded as legitimate 
by UN members in the first place. 
Although the Council has increasingly adopted 
documents that mention climate change, security 
risks have not been addressed in more detail due to a 
lack of evidence on direct impacts. In resolutions and 
other documents, climate change is generally iden-
tified in resolutions and other documents as a factor 
(“mainstreaming”) as a factor that can amplify exist-
ing crises. Lake Chad Resolution 2349, adopted in 
2017, is the first to state that there is a need for risk 
assessment and risk management strategies due to 
climate change.90 The Darfur Resolution 2429 (2018) 
goes one step further by recognising “the adverse 
effects of climate change, ecological changes and 
natural disasters, among other factors, on the situa-
 
security. See Auswärtiges Amt, Report of the Federal Foreign 
Office on Climate Foreign Policy (in German) (Berlin, December 
2019), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2295884/ 
ce7a2b35b139dcfec5e74facb68916e6/200124-klimabericht-dl-
data.pdf (accessed 18 February 2020). 
88 The Under Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo presented 
four areas of focus of the DPPA work at an Arria-formula 
meeting on 22 April 2020: more capacity for integrated risk 
analysis; integrating a climate lens into mediation efforts 
and preventive diplomacy; strengthening resilience to cope 
with climate-related security risks via peacebuilding pro-
grammes; working with and learning from partners, https:/ 
/dppa.un.org/en/climate-change-multiplying-factors-lead-to-
insecurity-millions-rosemary-dicarlo-tells-arria-formula 
(accessed 4 May 2020) 
89 See section “Forecasts and the ‘streetlight effect’”, 
pp. 24ff. 
90 UNSC, Resolution 2349 (2017). Adopted by the Security Council 
at its 7911th Meeting, on 31 March 2017 (New York, NY, 2017), 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/863830 (accessed 7 Feb-
ruary 2019). 
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tion in Darfur”. The UN and the Sudanese govern-
ment are being called upon to take these implications 
into account in their aid programmes for the region.91 
The mentioning of actual risks in resolutions opens 
up the possibility of using UN missions in crisis areas 
to contain climate risks. If mandates are extended in 
this direction, more stringent steps are also conceiv-
able. If the Security Council were to identify links 
between climate-related risks and terrorist activities, 
for example – as has happened in organised crime 
cases, despite controversial evidence92 – sanctions 
against individual actors would be conceivable, at 
least theoretically. However, this would always be 
subject to the proviso of “do no harm”, that is, poten-
tial negative effects on the population due to some 
measure would need to be considered. However, any 
extension of the Security Council’s capacity to act is 
unlikely as long as the direct nexus between climate 
risks and threats to human security that fall under 
the mandate of the Council cannot be identified. 
Another place to reconcile interests 
So far, the intention of the SIDS to use the Security 
Council as their venue for the debate on climate 
change has been met with a very mixed response. 
By continuing the debates in recent years, individual 
non-permanent members have managed to keep 
climate change and the demand for improving related 
information for the Security Council on the agenda. 
However, there is no guarantee that the debate will 
continue and that the Security Council will play an 
active role. This very much depends on whether the 
alternating non-permanent members (besides France 
and the United Kingdom) have the will and resources 
to do so. The importance of this factor was demon-
strated by the commitments of the Swedish and 
Dutch governments in 2017 and 2018. They worked 
hand in hand to make the Security Council members 
 
91 UNSC, Resolution 2429 (2018). Adopted by the Security Council 
at its 8311th Meeting, on 13 July 2018 (New York, NY, 2018), 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2429.pdf (accessed 
7 February 2019). 
92 Judith Vorrath, Organized Crime on the UN Security Council 
Agenda. Action against Human Trafficking Reveals Opportunities 
and Challenges, SWP Comment 38/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, October 2018), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publication/organized-crime-on-the-un-security-
council-agenda/ (accessed 10 March 2020). 
agree to the Lake Chad and Somalia resolutions. With 
the Planetary Security Initiative, policy-makers were 
able for the first time to exchange views with non-
state actors from the relevant policy areas. Then the 
Dominican Republic was able to address the issue 
in 2019 with the support of Germany, as its own re-
sources for this diplomatic effort were not sufficient. 
In order to maintain the UN Security Council as a 
venue for these debates, further diplomatic efforts are 
needed that must also be pursued by the supporting 
countries over the longer term. This includes handing 
over the issue to subsequent non-permanent mem-
bers as well as providing financial and human 
resources to the UN, but also engagement in all other 
climate policy forums, which include the UNFCCC, 
the G7, the G20, and bilateral summits. 
Tipping points and solar radiation 
management 
Some experts have raised the question of whether the 
Security Council, for precautionary reasons, cannot 
help but deal with the risks of climate change.93 After 
all, if the average global temperature continues to rise 
unabated, the related risks could have massive im-
pacts on international security. The most dangerous 
impacts could stem from the so-called tipping points 
of the Earth system94 and the domino effects they 
trigger. Examples are the effects on water supplies 
when glaciers disappear, the slow-down of the Gulf 
Stream when the Arctic ice melts, and the decline in 
permafrost, which destroys infrastructure and triggers 
methane gas outbreaks. Recent research shows that 
tipping points can become much more likely already 
at global temperature increases of between 1 and 2 
degrees Celsius, instead of more than 5 degrees 
Celsius, as models have predicted previously.95 The 
consequences for the Earth system would be massive, 
and the socio-economic implications would have 
high relevance for security policy, as supply shortages, 
 
93 Scott and Ku, “The UN Security Council and Global 
Action on Climate Change” (see note 19), 16. 
94 See section “Forecasts and the ‘streetlight effect’”, 
pp. 24ff. 
95 Steffen et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System in the 
Anthropocene” (see note 47); Timothy M. Lenton, Johan 
Rockström, Owen Gaffney, Stefan Rahmstorf, Katherine 
Richardson, Will Steffen, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, 
“Climate Tipping Points – Too Risky to Bet Against”, Nature 
575, no. 7784 (2019): 592–95. 
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natural disasters, and migration would be expected.96 
The Security Council would have a reactive rather 
than a preventive role in the event of such a crisis 
situation. For this reason, US think tanks assert a 
responsibility to prepare for national security policy – 
a concept that has also been introduced into the 
debates of the Security Council.97 The fact that it 
has found little resonance is primarily due to the 
US government’s position on climate policy. 
Solar radiation management through 
intervention in the stratosphere 
could become a topic for the 
Security Council. 
However, a repositioning of Washington cannot 
be ruled out, even in the short term when it comes 
to preventing extreme weather events in the United 
States. To this end, the Trump administration could 
consider solar radiation management as a matter of 
national interest. Solar radiation management in-
volves targeted interventions in the Earth’s radiation 
system to reduce global warming.98 The technological 
options are subject to intense and controversial 
debate. However, the knowledge is still lacking as to 
whether the desired effects would materialise and 
could be controlled. In 2020/2021, in a first test, a 
project team at Harvard University intends to intro-
duce aerosols into the stratosphere that reflect sun-
light.99 If solar radiation management were applied 
 
96 Steffen et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System in the 
Anthropocene” (see note 47), 5. 
97 A Responsibility to Prepare. Strengthening National and Home-
land Security in the Face of a Changing Climate (Roadmap and 
Recommendations for the U.S. Government) (Washington, 
D.C.: The Center for Climate and Security/Elliot School of 
International Affairs – George Washington University, 
26 February 2018). 
98 Weather modifications already took place in the United 
States in the 1940s for military reasons. In China, repeated 
attempts were made to trigger precipitation over drought-
affected areas. See Susanne Dröge, “Geoengineering Loom-
ing: Climate Control the American or Chinese Way”, in 
Expect the Unexpected. Ten Situations to Keep an Eye On, ed. Bar-
bara Lippert and Volker Perthes, SWP Research Paper 1/2012 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2012), 
15–18, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/ 
products/research_papers/2012_RP01_lpt_prt.pdf#page=15 
(accessed 10 March 2020). 
99 Oliver Geden and Susanne Dröge, The Anticipatory 
Governance of Solar Radiation Management, Council on Foreign 
Relations, Council of Councils Working Paper Series, July 
on a broad scale by some countries or private actors, 
this would likely put pressure on those countries that 
do not want to participate in that effort or are clearly 
opposed to it. Once an intervention in the strato-
sphere is undertaken, the impacts cannot be limited 
to individual territories and could thus affect other 
countries negatively. Given the conflict potential that 
can already be anticipated today, the issue could be 
brought to the Security Council at some point. The 
Council could, in theory, intervene to prevent third 
parties from using the technology or decide that its 
members should refrain from doing so. However, this 
is unlikely in our example here, since the United 
States is a member of the P5 and would have to agree 
to such a decision.100 
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During its temporary period on the Security Council 
in 2019/2020, the German government intends to 
strengthen the credibility of the UN climate regime 
and the processes for implementing the Paris Agree-
ment as a whole. An open debate at the Security 
Council is thus an important part of this agenda. 
During the campaign for a seat on the Council in 
2018, the German government had already promised 
to the SIDS that it would hold an open debate and – 
as far as possible – promote a Security Council deci-
sion on climate-related risks. 
Since this announcement, international climate 
cooperation has further declined, and with the 
COVID-19 crisis, the role of the Security Council as a 
key multilateral institution has diminished further. 
Not only has the crisis added to a situation in which a 
lack of climate leadership by the two major powers – 
the United States and China – prevails. On top if 
this, both started a blame-game about the origins of 
the pandemic. The United States put even more 
pressure on the UN system via another withdrawal of 
finance, this time for the World Health Organization. 
This will also have an effect on the legitimacy of the 
Council and its role in dealing with climate issues. 
The German government intends to highlight the 
causal links between climate change and conflicts 
with more evidence and to pronounce the importance 
of early warning systems for security policy. The 
pandemic and its fallouts could be integrated into 
this setting, as they bring about long-term risks that 
relate to environmental destruction and climate 
change, too. However, if the political goal of the 
debate is to vigorously promote cooperation in inter-
national climate policy, and thus promote the im-
plementation of the Paris Agreement, adding the pan-
demic can be a risky undertaking, given the tensions 
that have increased between countries struggling 
with it. In the fourth year after the Trump adminis-
tration took office, there is no doubt that support for 
the core concerns of the multilateral process – above 
all through national climate ambition – is not on the 
US agenda. The Security Council debate scheduled for 
July 2020 should therefore explicitly draw renewed 
attention to the risks of inaction and avoid offering 
another platform for a US-China showdown on their 
performance in dealing with the COVID-19 virus. 
In 2020, the German government is also in a posi-
tion to support the EU as the actor that, under new 
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, has for-
mulated a “Green Deal”. This also includes raising the 
European climate protection target, stimulating green 
investment, and buffering the social impacts resulting 
from economic transition.101 Germany will hold the 
EU Council Presidency in the second half of the year, 
which will enable it to combine the internal progress 
on climate policy within the EU with an economic 
and financial recovery agenda for the aftermath of 
COVID-19. Because COP26 – scheduled for November 
in Glasgow – had to be postponed until 2021, the 
EU also will need German and UK expertise to bring 
forward the implementation of the Paris Agreement 
through UN negotiations. A proactive EU agenda 
would serve the international purpose of providing 
a reliable and long-term commitment to tackling 
climate change. 
Moreover, the UNFCCC negotiations must avoid 
calling into question the loss and damage agenda 
agreed in Madrid 2019. With the help of the expert 
groups that have been set up, more evidence on the 
concerns of vulnerable states should be generated, 
 
101 European Commission, The European Green Deal. 2019, 
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for example by providing better information on pos-
sible negative climate impacts and the potential to 
address them. Much depends on financial commit-
ments and their uptake in the climate regime. Also, 
the UN would be a place to promote the idea that any 
international recovery or aid programmes for address-
ing the pandemic could be scrutinised for their long-
term climate adaptation relevance. In this context, it 
can be expected that countries will raise the preven-
tive role of development cooperation and disaster pre-
vention in the Security Council debate in July 2020. 
The chances that another Security Council debate 
on climate and security will also produce new docu-
ments and decisions depend above all on the political 
situation in the United States (where presidential 
elections will be held in November 2020) and on the 
attitude of China and Russia towards any concrete 
proposal. Security Council decisions – in particular 
new resolution on the risks of climate change – 
have to be carefully prepared and tested for a com-
mon denominator. It is important to achieve an 
abstention – instead of a no vote – from the three 
powers mentioned. After all, there are signs that the 
United States is prepared to talk about how to deal 
with the consequences of natural disasters. The 
search for common concerns could help to ensure 
that the divide between the major polluters (China, 
the United States, and Russia alone were responsible 
for 56.5 per cent of global CO2 emissions in 2017)
102 
and the developing countries suffering from climate 
change does not deepen even further. 
If climate protection continues to 
make only slow progress, demands 
for compensation are likely to 
become even louder. 
The German government therefore has to act as 
mediator. In times of weakened multilateralism, it 
can use its status as a reliable partner in the G7 and 
G20 to this end – especially because cooperation 
in climate policy with the United States (current G7 
Presidency) and Saudi Arabia (G20 Presidency) can 
hardly be expected. But other major economic 
powers, such as China, Brazil, India, and Australia, 
 
102 Iman Ghosh, “All of the World’s Carbon Emissions in 
One Giant Chart. Data Based on the Global Carbon Project”, 
Visual Capitalist, 31 May 2019, https://www.visualcapitalist. 
com/all-the-worlds-carbon-emissions-in-one-chart/ (accessed 
22 August 2019). 
must be kept on board. Preventive approaches to 
reduce climate change risks can also be promoted 
with the help of German and European development 
policy. In security policy forums such as the Munich 
Security Conference and in bilateral meetings, the 
links between climate change and security policy 
risks can be further discussed and explained, thus 
promoting preventive approaches as part of short- 
and long-term agendas.103 Preparing for the Security 
Council debate with the help of the so-called Group 
of Friends on Climate and Security, which Germany 
and the Pacific island state Nauru set up in 2018, has 
also served this purpose,104 as did the Arria meet-
ings105 (see Table 2, p. 12). 
Neither German and nor European climate diplo-
macy, however, is well-equipped to enable lasting 
progress in handling security policy-relevant climate 
issues at the Security Council. The COVID-19 pan-
demic adds another stress test to this constellation. 
When considering how to scale-up Germany’s role for 
a successful international climate agenda, also during 
times when Germany does not have a seat on the 
Security Council, one of the major issues for support-
ing partner countries is the consistency of national 
climate policy. From a climate diplomacy perspective, 
the SIDS and other vulnerable poor countries experi-
ence the UN processes as being closely intertwined. 
The less progress Germany and the EU make in im-
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on Climate and Fragility Risks (adelphi, International Alert, 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015), 
https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/#report-top (accessed 
3 August 2018). 
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on Climate and Security” (Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 
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105 Arria-Formula meetings are not formal Security Coun-
cil meetings. They are convened at the initiative of one or 
more Security Council members and are intended to hear 
the views of individuals, organisations, and institutions on 
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See Security Council Report, Arria Formula Meetings. UN Secu-
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https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-
working-methods/arria-formula-meetings.php (accessed 
20 January 2020). 
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plementing the Paris Agreement, the more develop-
ing countries and civil society actors will demand that 
they be compensated for losses and damages, and 
that the Security Council increase its commitment to 
address climate change impacts. Germany’s commit-
ment to international climate policy, therefore, has 
to be accompanied by credible and long-term climate 
ambitions and actions. Strengthening the long-term 
EU agenda (Green Deal, greenhouse gas neutrality by 
2050) is an important part of this. 
In the General Assembly, the German government 
may well be in a position to mobilise a large number 
of countries that are increasingly affected by climate-
related loss and damage – but this alone will not be 
enough to convince the three major veto powers: the 
United States, Russia, and China. Germany cannot 
walk the talk exclusively in 2020; it has to develop 
a longer-term agenda together with other partner 
countries inside and outside the EU. Together, they 
could further promote a cultural shift at the UN 
Security Council that makes it a place for exchange 
on climate risks and security policy implications. 
Specifically, for each period of non-permanent mem-
bership, governments should be encouraged to con-
tinue the climate security debate. For this reason, the 
German government should also secure the resources 
that help to provide the necessary information for 
this body in the longer term. The UN agencies and 
their units should be supported in such a way that 
they can provide the Security Council with forecasts 
and early warnings on the direct impacts of climate 
change and, where relevant, in the context of actual 
conflict constellations. Such an agenda would become 
particularly urgent if the current US administration 
were to remain in office for another four years – in 
which case it could be expected that other major eco-
nomic powers would follow in neglecting national 
and international climate policy. 
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